## People Authentication I

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December 15, 2003

## Authentication Objectives

* User identification (name, id, etc.)
* User validation (proof of identity)
* Resource identification (name, address, etc.)
* Resource validation (proof of identity)
* Access control (permission lists)
* Monitoring (online, offline)
* Auditing (logs, books)
* Other . . .

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## Authentication Considerations

* Accuracy Level
* Validation Time
* Processing Power
* Operating Costs
* System Reliability

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## Authentication Methods

1. Something the user knows:
$>$ Memorable Data - passwords, pass phrases, personal information
2. Something the user is/has:
$>$ Biometrics - finger prints, palm geometry, retina scan, iris scan, face recognition, signature characteristics, typing characteristics, DNA recognition
3. Something the user holds:
$>\underline{\text { Tokens }}$ - ID card, paper card, key, smart card, crypto token, etc.

## Passwords (II)

* Password lengths at some university (from a study in the early 1990's):
> Password should be easy to remember
> Password should be hard to guess
* Problem:
> Cannot achieve desirable two properties above with (current) humans


## Passwords (I)

* Desirable properties:

| Length | Number | Percentage |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 55 | 0.4 |
| 2 | 87 | 0.6 |
| 3 | 212 | 2 |
| 4 | 449 | 3 |
| 5 | 1260 | 9 |
| 6 | 3035 | 22 |
| 7 | 2917 | 21 |
| 8 | 5772 | 42 |
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## Passwords (III)

* Common situation:
> Short passwords (between 4 and 8 characters)
> English words (few thousands)
$>$ Names (few hundreds)
> Personal data (easy to obtain)
$>$ Combinations of above (easy to compute)
$>$ Passwords are written somewhere (easy to find)
> Password in many systems (break one - break all)


## Passwords (IV)

Attacks on passwords:
$>$ Password guessing
> Searching for passwords
> Online dictionary attacks
> Offline password cracking
> Sniffing communication lines
> Social engineering

## Passwords (V)

* How/where passwords are Stored:
$>$ Not hidden and not access-protected (some PC's)
> Hidden but not access-protected (some appliances)
> Access-protected (Unix, NT, other OS)
> Encrypted (but where is the key stored)
> Hashed (Unix, NT, other OS)
> Protected server (distributed systems)


## Passwords (VI)

* Unix "salt" mechanism:
$\Rightarrow$ When user A opens an account, a password $\mathrm{pw}_{\mathrm{A}}$ is defined, and a random 12 -bit salt $_{\mathrm{A}}$ is selected
> The Unix password file stores both salt ${ }_{\mathrm{A}}$ and the value of $\mathrm{h}\left(\mathrm{pw}_{\mathrm{A}}\right.$, salt $\left._{\mathrm{A}}\right)$ at the entry for user A
> When a user attempts to log on as A and types some pw, the system takes salt ${ }_{\mathrm{A}}$ from A's entry in the file, computes $\mathrm{h}\left(\mathrm{pw}\right.$, salt $\left._{\mathrm{A}}\right)$, and compares the result to what is stored in the file. A match allows logging on.
> This scheme makes online dictionary attacks infeasible (since each password can be hashed in $4096=2^{12}$ ways). This scheme is not resilient against offline password cracking.

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## Passwords (VII)

* Password breaking recipes:
> Try default passwords used in standard system accounts
> Exhaustively search all short passwords
> Try words from online dictionaries
> Collect and try data that is related to users (user names, family member names, birth dates, identification numbers, etc.)
> Try common combinations of user data (e.g., reverse writing, adding digits at end of passwords, etc.)
> Look for written passwords
> Observe password typing patterns


## Passwords (VIII)

* Password breaking recipes (continued):
> Use a Trojan horse to steal users' passwords
> Eavesdrop to communication lines
> Get access to passwords files
> Analyze the (hashed / encrypted) passwords file
> Get from machine to machine with OS facilities and/or with known passwords
> Pretend to be a legitimate user and ask the administrator to issue you a new password
> Pretend to be a legitimate administrator and ask the user to disclose the password


## Passwords (IX)

* System recommendations:
> Educate users of importance of password security
> Monitor user accounts for suspicious behavior
> Lock account after a number of unsuccessful login attempts
> Keep password file encrypted or hashed
> Use password strengthening mechanisms (e.g. Unix salt)
> Keep password files in secure locations (directories in the file system, special servers, etc.)
> Request users to change passwords frequently
> Run password cracking tests and disallow weak passwords
> Use passwords only as one factor in authentication process


## Passwords (X)

* Password selection recommendations:
> Use combinations of letters, upper-case, lower-case, digits, other characters
> Change passwords frequently
> Use different passwords in different systems
> Use random passwords (8-10 characters long)
> Use readable passwords (16-20 characters)
> Use pass-phrases (30-40 character sentences)


## Passwords (XI)

## ※ Password Administration Scenario:

> Admin: Passwords must be changed every 90 days
> User: Changes the password to the same password
> Admin: Check that password is changed to a new one
> User: Changes the password and changes again to the old one
> Admin: Tracks last n passwords and checks that password is new
> User: Changes the password $\mathrm{n}+1$ times and returns to old one
> Admin: Disallows more than one password change per day
> User: Changes to the same password with $1,2,3, \ldots$ at the end
> Admin: Disallows passwords that are "too similar" to old ones
> User: Invents a random password and writes it down on paper

## Passwords (XII)

* Summary:
> Accurate negative
> Not accurate positive
> Secret user data
> Secret server data
> Easy to break
$>$ Simple to operate
> Portable
> Transferable
> Not easily revocable
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## Biometrics (I)

* Biometrics consists of checking physical, biological or physiological properties of a person
* Certain properties are highly unique to each person
* Need to select properties that are:
> Easy to detect
> Provide high levels of accuracy
Need to maintain database of biometrics parameters


## Biometrics (II)

* Finger Prints:
> 2-D geometry
> 3-D geometry
> Liveliness checks (pulse, temperature, etc)
> Capacitance / resistance checks

Relatively accurate

* Needs maintenance
* Acceptance level is increasing


## Biometrics (III)

* Palm Geometry:
> 2-D geometry
> Finger lengths
> Finger widths
> Gaps between fingers
* Good accuracy
* Low maintenance

* High acceptance


## Biometrics (IV)

* Retina Scan:
> 2-D map of blood vessels
> Blood vessels are warmer than surrounding tissues
> Detected by IR radiation
* Highly accurate

* Expensive (special equipment)
* Invasive (low acceptance)


## Biometrics (V)

* Iris Scan:
$>2-\mathrm{D}$ map of iris texture
> Detection by camera
* Relatively accurate
* Inexpensive

* Non-invasive (high acceptance)


## Biometrics (VI)

* Face Recognition:
> 2-D image
> Bone-muscle model
> Under-skin thermal radiation
* Detection by camera / IR
* Good accuracy
* Non-invasive


## Biometrics (VII)

$\star$ Signature Characteristics:
> 2-D image
> Dynamic signature
> Online test
> Speed, pressure, angles, etc.

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* Highly accurate
* Low maintenance
* High acceptance


## Biometrics (VIII)

* Typing Characteristics:
> Dynamic typing parameters
> Speed, gaps, letter patterns
> Online test
> Could be tacit
* Highly accurate
* Low maintenance
* High acceptance


## Biometrics (IX)

* DNA Recognition:
> DNA matching against known patterns
> Sample could be taken from external tissues

Highly accurate

* Expensive (equipment)
* Conceived as invasive
* Not widely used (yet)


## Biometrics (X)

* Biometric System Components:




## Biometrics (XI)

* Accuracy levels:
> FAR - False Accept Ratio
> FRR - False Reject Ratio

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## Tokens (I)

* Physical Tokens:
> Physical keys (to physical locks)
> Paper/plastic cards (ID, passwords, procedures, etc.)
> Smart cards (crypto keys, algorithms, contact or contact-less, etc.)

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## Biometrics (XII)

$\star$ Biometrics - Summary:
$>$ Not totally accurate (positive \& negative)
$>$ Private data (not secret data)
> Easy to steal data
> Costly to operate
> Portable
> Non-transferable
> Non-revocable

## Tokens (II)

$\%$ Tokens - Summary:
> Highly accurate (positive \& negative)
> Secret data / code
$>$ Some are hard to forge
> Some are expensive
$>$ Simple but costly
> Portable
> Some are transferable
$>$ Some are revocable

## One-Time Passwords (I)

* Password Lists:
> User has card with N one-time passwords
> Server stores password list
> Need to administer after N uses



## One-Time Passwords (II)

* S/Key:
$>$ Card stores seed $X_{0}$ of a hash chain of length N
$>$ Server stores end of hash chain: $X_{N}=H^{(N)}\left(X_{0}\right)$
$>$ User submits password $\mathrm{X}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{H}^{(\mathrm{N}-\mathrm{i})}\left(\mathrm{X}_{0}\right)$ at use i
$>$ Need to administer after N uses


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## Crypto Tokens (I)

* Token types:
> Lists of one-time-passwords
> Hash Engines for S/Key-like protocols
> Crypto keys and algorithms
> Clocks and time-synchronization algorithms
> Password / PIN for token enabling / disabling
> Password / PIN can be part of protocol


## Crypto Tokens (II)

* Cryptographic Time-Challenge-Response Tokens:
* User enters PIN to enable token
* Token computes one-time-password based on:
> secret key, current time, user PIN
* Server verifies one-time-password



[^0]:    * Assist in opening / remembering / computing

